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AGENCY-CLIENTELE RELATIONS: A STUDY OF
THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION*
WILLIAM P. McLAUCHLAN**
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been much scholarly criticism of regulatory
agencies.1 Critics have focused on both the substantive policies of
regulation and the procedures by which agency decisions are reached.2
Many observers charge that agency overregulation has prevented mar-
ket allocation of goods and services by the regulated industry.' Others
argue that the raison d'6tre for government regulation, the natural
monopoly, cannot be successfully regulated.' Such criticisms chal-
* The author wishes to thank Richard Slabach for his research assistance during
the data collection stage of this project.
** Associate Professor of Political Science, Purdue University; currently Visiting
Research Fellow, University of Michigan; Ph.D., University of Wisconsin; J.D., Uni-
versity of Chicago.
1. The term "regulatory agency" refers to the agencies which traditionally have
been given statutory authority to regulate business activity, such as the CAB, FCC,
FPC, FTC, ICC, NLRB, and SEC. These differ from other agencies which provide
benefits--social or economic-to particular groups of citizens as a result of government
largesse. See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE LJ. 733 (1964). It is suggested
that clientele and other interests relating to these two groups of agencies are substan-
tially different and conclusions drawn from this study cannot suggest much about rela-
tionships in the benefit-dispensing agencies.
2. For the two best recent surveys of administrative agency problems, see Freed-
man, Crisis and Legitimacy in the Administrative Process, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1041
(1975); Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HAv. L. REV.
1667 (1975).
3. See, e.g., G. DOUGLAS & J. MILLr ECONOMIC REGULATION OF DOMESTIC AIR
TRANSPORT: THEORY AND POLICY (1974); PROMOTING COMPETITION IN REGULATED
MARKETS (A. Phillips ed. 1975); THE CRISIS OF THE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS (P.
MacAvoy ed. 1970); Cutler & Johnson, Regulation and The Political Process, 84 YALE
L.J. 1395 (1975); Lazarus & Onek, The Regulators and the People, 57 VA. L. Rnv.
1069 (1971); Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. Cm. L, Rv. 47 (1969).
4. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. Rnv. 548 (1969).
The allocation of a scarce resource by non-market means also serves as a justification
for state regulation. E.g., H. LEvrN, THE INISIBLE RESOURCE (1971); DeVany, Eckert,
Meyers, O'Hara, & Scott, A Property System for Market Allocation of the Electromag-
netic Spectrum: A Legal-Economic-Engineering Study, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1499 (1969);
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lenge the basic legitimacy of the regulatory process itself, and its under-
lying political, social, and economic justifications.5
Other critics question the decision-making procedures of regulatory
agencies." They focus on the tendency of these bodies to become cap-
tives of their clientele.7  The manner in which agencies may be cap-
tured varies. Regulatory agencies and the industries they are charged
with regulating enjoy a high rate of personnel interchange, particularly
in managerial positions. Agency heads who are not reappointed by the
President frequently are employed by the regulated industry; agency
decisions unfavorable to the industry jeopardize future exchanges."
In addition, the client appears regularly before the agency, requesting
various policy determinations. Often the agency must rely on the in-
dustry and its experts to provide the technical information upon which
the agency acts. Because consumer or the general public's opposition
to industry demands is usually unorganized, the agency is rarely ex-
posed to an alternative to the industry's position. Thus, the agencies
Johnson, Towers of Babel: The Chaos in Radio Spectrum Utilization and Allocation,
34 LAw & CONTEMP. PRon. 505 (1969); Levin, The Radio Spectrum Resource, 11 J.
L. & EcoN. 433 (1968).
5. See, e.g., S. BaEER & P. MAcAvoY, ENERGY REGULATION BY THE FEDERAL
POWER COMMISSION (1974); THE Ciusis OF Tm REGULATORY COMMISSIONS, supra note
3.
6. See M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISS!ON
(1955); Sabatier, Social Movements and Regulatory Agencies: Is "Clientele Capture"
Inevitable? (1974) (paper delivered at Western Political Science Ass'n Meeting). For
procedural changes, see Gellhorn, Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings,
81 YALE L.J 359 (1972). For structural changes, see R. NOLL, REFORMING REOULA-
TION: AN EVALUATION OF THE AsH ComcIL PROPOSALS (1971); THE PRESIDENT'S AD-
VISORY COUNCIL ON EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATIONS, A NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK:
REPORT ON SELECTED INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES (1971) [hereinafter cited as
the Ash Council Report].
7. For the first major exposition of this theory, see M. BERNSTEIN, supra note 6.
For other discussion of this point, see Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative
Process: A Reevaluation, 67 HARV. L. Rpv. 1105, 1107 (1954); Lazarus & Onek, supra
note 3, at 1075; Comment, Public Participation in Federal Administrative Proceedings,
120 U. PA. L. REv. 702, 708 (1972); Sabatier, supra note 6, at 1-9. Sabatier focuses
on a case-study test of the capture hypothesis. Stewart, supra note 2, at 1685-88, pre-
sents a useful set of subdivisions of this argument which sheds substantial light on the
meaning of the thesis. But see Jaffe, The Administrative Agency and Environmental
Control, 20 BUFFALO L. REv. 231, 232 (1970) (all political institutions are captives
of one or more political clientele).
8. For an interesting treatment of this phenomen'on, see Geller, .4 Modest Pro-
posal for Modest Reform of the Federal Communications Commission; 63 GEo. L.I.
705 (1975). See also Thomas, Politics, Structure, and Personnel in Administrative Reg-
ulation, 57 VA. L. REv. 1033 (1971).
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over time are persuaded by the claims of the industries they regulate
and repeatedly make decisions favorable to them.9 In view of this, sev-
eral commentators have proposed abandoning the regulatory agencies'
"independence,"' 10 to make them politically accountable." Others favor
9. See note 6 supra and accompanying text. Although not an advocate of the
clientele-capture thesis, R. NOLL, supra note 6, at 40-46, presents a cogent statement
of it. See also Noll, Selling Research to Regulatory Agencies in THE ROLE OF ANALYsis
IN REGULATORY DECISIONMAKING: Tim CASE OF CABLE TELEVISION (R. Park ed. 1973),
which develops a particular subcategory of the thesis positing that the agency's deci-
sions tend to be designed to create the least political conflict possible. Decisions
which are acceptable to most of the clientele will, in the long run, be those which
predominate in agency policies. The reason for this is that the agency does not want
to face possible reversal or reprimand from another political arena such as an appellate
court or the Congress, and a decision supported by most of the clientele will tend to
produce the least political opposition.
10. For a presentation of the case for the current lack of agency independence,
see Cutler & Johnson, supra note 3, at 1402-05. See also Freedman, supra note 2,
at 1047-51 (discussing this "problem" in the administrative process). Wilson, however,
in The Politics of Regulation in SOCIAL RESPONSIBILTY AND THE BUSiNESS PREDICATAENT
158 (J. McKie ed. 1974), points out that some agencies, such as the FCC, were de-
signed to allocate resources among users, and may not have been intended to be inde-
pendent; in fact, their close identity with the clientle was part of the initial outline of
the legislation.
11. One such proposal would require agency members to be elected or to represent
functional categories of constituents in an effort to balance the interests and pressures
which have surfaced in agency politics. See Stewart, supra note 2, at 1790-98. Such
proposals aim to place agencies in the political system, thus making them responsive
to the political pressures to which other institutions (such as the executive and legisla-
tive branches) and actors (congressmen and the President) are subject. The success
of such suggestions seems doubtful given the problems of identifying constituencies, and
establishing a selection (or election) process required to insure the public accountability
of such agency members. Other proposals are designed to make the agencies more re-
sponsive to political institutions, if not to make the agencies themselves more politically
responsive. See Cutler & Johnson, supra note 3; R. NOLL, supra note 6.
The Ash Council Report proposed making the agencies (with few exceptions, includ-
ing the FCC) into single-administrator agencies within the executive branch so that
the President would have closer and more explicit control over agency decisions, opera-
tions, and policy directions. This suggestion was intended to make the agencies more
responsive to the executive and managerially more efficient. In part, this would be
achieved by reducing the collegial nature of the agencies, and by placing the agencies
under direct supervision of the Chief Executive. Despite President Nixon's efforts at
executive reorganization, the Ash Council did not produce any actual restructuring of
agencies, although it did result in a variety of scholarly criticisms of the proposal. For
example, one law review published an entire issue on various reactions to the Ash Coun-
cil Report, 57 VA. L. REv. 925, 925-1108 (1971). See also R. NOLL, supra note 6.
The extreme form of these proposals to politicize regulatory agencies is in the cur-
rent proposals in Congress to eliminate various agencies. As a prime example, the
Mikva proposal, the "Regulatory Agency Self-Destruct Act," H.R. 11278, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1975), would have had regulatory agencies self-destruct on July 4, 1976,
Washington University Open Scholarship
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continued agency independence so long as their proceedings and pro-
cedures are open to greater public participation."2
What groups, besides the industry being regulated, should be al-
lowed or required to participate in agency proceedings? 3 Tradition-
ally, only the interests of well-organized groups with resources suffi-
cient to intervene formally were given consideration by the agency. Re-
cently, however, courts and commentators have begun to examine the
utility of granting unstructured interest groups access to agency pro-
ceedings.14 The type of agency proceeding often determines whether
access will be given. 5 For example, a general consumer interest group
can contribute most effectively to rule-making proceedings that call for
policy statements rather than technical data or specific evidence. The
concerns of other groups, however, may be more adequately presented
by "public interest" law firms in formal, trial-type hearings. Those in-
terest groups directly injured by alleged violations of agency rules or
threatened by proposed agency actions, as well as groups with knowl-
edge bearing directly on an agency's decision, arguably have a right to
intervene in such an adversarial proceeding.
if Congress and the President determined that the agency had inadequately promoted
the "public welfare." Without defining the standards by which agency performance
was to be judged, the proposal permitted another review in seven and fourteen years
after this first review to insure that the surviving agencies continued to function
in a way which Congress and the President judged to be in the public welfare. The
political burden such an institutional arrangement would place on the subjected agencies
is clear, and one could suggest that the agencies involved would devote a good
deal more of their time, if not all of it, to justifying their existence to congressional
committees and the President, rather than formulating regulatory policy. The current
legislative oversight suggests that agencies are already sensitive to such political pres-
sures. See R. RnirLEY & G. FRANKLIN, CoNGREss, THE BUREAUCRACY, AND PUBLIC POL-
icy (1976); Krasnow & Shooshan, Congressional Oversight: The Ninety-Second Con-
gress and the Federal Communications Commission, 10 HARV. J. LEGIs. 297 (1973).
12. See Gellhorn, supra note 6, at 359; Lazarus & Onek, supra note 3, at 1070,
1092-93. See also note 14 infra and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of interests that might contend for representational rights be-
fore agencies in various proceedings, see Stewart, supra note 2, at 1762-69. See also
Gellhorn, supra note 6, at 376-82; Comment, supra note 7, at 731-34.
14. See, e.g., National Welfare Rights Organization v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725 (D.C.
Cir. 1970); Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359
F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d
608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). See also Stewart, supra note
2; Comment, supra note 7.
15. Cramton, The Why, Where and How of Broadened Public Participation in the
Administrative Process, 60 GEo. LJ. 525, 531-34 (1972); Gellhorn, supra note 6, at
369-72; Comment, supra note 7, at 735,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1977/iss2/2
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Beyond the rule-making-adjudication dichotomy, the various inter-
mediate stages of formality and specificity in agency proceedings
require ad hoe consideration of the potential contributions intervening
public participants can make to the agency's decision-making processes.
In assessing the benefits of greater access, agencies must weigh the
costs to potential intervenors and the agency itself. The problem is
that the least resourceful, most unorganized interest may have the
greatest stake in a decision. The issue thus is whether and under what
circumstances the agency should facilitate intervention by such an
interest.'
Commentators have assumed that any changes in agency procedures
will result in substantive policy changes.' The actual effects of such
changes, however, may be agency-specific.' 8 Therefore, the impact of
changes in judicial, statutory, or agency procedures on its policies
should be assessed in relation to a particular agency, its clientele, and
its functions.19 The balancing of competing interests may result in only
minor substantive changes; for example, the cost barrier to nonclientele
interests may preclude intervention in situations where the regulated
client is likely to seek appellate review of unfavorable agency decisions.
In addition, the regulated clientele may exert pressure on other political
institutions to offset any substantive policy changes.
Despite these problems, intervenors and other affected parties are
placing increased pressure on agencies to accommodate their claims.20
16. For a discussion of one kind of agency facilitation-funds for impecunious inter-
venors, see Note, Federal Agency Assistance to Impecunious Intervenors, 88 HARV. L.
REv. 1815 (1975).
17. See note 6 supra and accompanying text. See also Stewart, supra note 2, at
1776.
18. Gellhorn, supra note 6, at 388-89.
19. The actual impact will probably depend on an intensely political process within
the agency in which the various clientele interests, both new and established, will seek
to have the agency balance one set more heavily than the others, and thus use procedu-
ral innovations to specific interest advantage. Stewart, supra note 2, at 1790. For
the thesis that regulatory agencies make decisions which cause the least amount of dis-
turbance in the political system, see R. NoL.L, supra note 6, at 40-45. See also Lazarus
& Onek, supra note 3, at 1071; McLachlan, Democratizing the Administrative Proc-
ess: Toward Increasing Responsiveness, 13 ARiz. L. REv. 835 (1971).
20. See note 14 supra and accompanying text. Scenic Hudson Preservation Confer-
ence v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966), suggests
that conservationists with an aesthetic interest in the agency decision may intervene.
National Welfare Rights Organization v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1970), suggests
that the beneficiaries of agency operation should be allowed to intervene in formal pro-
ceedings. There is no clear indication, however, that such intervention is required in
Number 2]
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As these groups gradually obtain the resources to pursue their claims in
the courts or legislature, the regulatory agencies will be forced to con-
sider their interests in reaching decisions, or be faced with repeated,
costly, and often successful appeals. Thus, agencies may eventually
,adjust their status quo orientation in response to the pressures from
intervenors and other decision-making institutions.
Although appellate courts2' are now exerting pressure on agencies to
expand their decisional processes to include certain nonclientele inter-
ests, they appear to be acting without clearly defined goals.22 This
Article will examine the recent court-mandated procedural changes of
one regulatory agency-the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) .23 Using empirical data, the Article will study the effect of the
FCC's efforts to remedy complaints about its processes on its operation.
Unfortunately, because each agency has its unique clientele, sover-
eigns, and subject matter jurisdiction, a case study such as this can pro-
vide no basis for generalizations. The author hopes, however, that
such an empirical study will provide a sound foundation upon which
to evaluate efforts to change one agency's procedures, and subse-
quently, its decisions.24
informal, agency-clientele negotiations, although they might affect the intervenor's inter-
est as much as a formal hearing.
21. The Supreme Court has not directly dealt with the question of intervention in
agency proceedings. The cases most on point are the standing cases: Barlow v. Collins,
397 U.S. 159 (1970); Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150 (1970); and the recent decision relating to thd allocation of intervention-
litigation costs among parties to such a case: Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness
Soe'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
22. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals did state that the groups
eligible to intervene must be "responsible and representative." Office of Communica-
tion of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1005 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
The only other indication given by the court in this opinion was that such intervenors
usually concern themselves with a wide range of community problems, and represent
broad rather than narrow interests-public rather than private or commercial interests.
The court sought to meet the need of providing "a means for reflection of listener
appraisal of licensee's performance as the performance meets or fails to meet the licen-
see's statutory obligation to operate the facility in the public interest." Id. at 1006.
23. See Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425
F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1969); notes 67-70 infra and accompanying text.
24. Thomas, supra note 8, suggests that empirical studies provide a basis for the-
oretical discussion, because without empirical data, any suggestion might seem successful
until it faced the test of real world application. Once it is put into operation, and
tested, it may quickly fail. Freedman, supra note 2, presents an essay on the fundamen-
tal complaints regarding agencies. It appears that the remedy of broadened public par-
ticipation which will be examined here, carries no guarantee as a solution to the prob-https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1977/iss2/2
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II. THE CONTEXT OF FCC OPERATION
A. Functions and Authority of the FCC
The FCC was created in 193423 to regulate two separate aspects of
communications: spectrum management, formerly lodged in the Fed-
eral Radio Commission, and interstate communications common carriers,
originally assigned to the Interstate Commerce Commission. The
Commission was granted power to regulate communications common
carriers in order to prevent these natural monopolies from setting
monopolistic prices .2  Advocates of agency regulation argue that a
single supplier should be permitted to provide a service in cases where
competition would result in costly duplication of heavy capital invest-
ment services.2 7  Although its assumptions have been challenged, 8 this
theory of natural monopolies continues to be the basic justification for
the Commission's regulatory power.
Unlike the Social Security and Veteran's Administrations which
stpply benefits to the recipient groups, the-FCC has the authority to
grant licenses to and approve the tariffs for various communications car-
tiers.- In addition, the Commission has jurisdiction to approve con-
struction permits for interstate communications systems3" and to regulate
the development and use of international communications. With the
emergence of satellite communications in the past fifteen years, the
FCC has become the center of international31 and domestic satellite
communications systems through the licensing of INTELSAT and
DOMSAT users.Y2
lems. The public participation solution seems to be simply the most visible of several
current "remedies" for the problems which people find in agency decisions and policy
directions.
25. The Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 301(f), Title II;
47 U.S.C. § 201-223 (1970), relates to common carrier regulation.
26. See 2 A. KAHN, THE EcoNoMIcs OF REGULATION ch. 4 (1971); Posner, supra
note 4.
27. See notes 2 and 4 supra and accompanying text.
28. Posner, supra note 4.
29. 47 U.S.C. §§ 201, 203, 204, 205 (1970).
30. 47 U.S.C. § 214(a) (1970).
31. Communications Satellite Act of 1962, 47 U.S.C. §§ 701-744 (1970). This
statute gives the FCC jurisdiction over various aspects of communications satellites. See
47 U.S.C. § 721 (1971).
32. R. NOLL, M. PECK, & J. McGowAN, EcoNowc ASPECTS OF TELEVISION RrGu-
LATION (1973); M. SNOW, INTERNATIONAL COmMERCIAL SATELLrrm CoMMUNICATIONs:
ECONOMIC AND POLMCAL ISSUES OF Tm FIRsT DECADE OF INTELSAT (1976).
Number 2] 263
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One of the Commission's recent and most significant policy efforts
has been to inject some competition into the common carrier industry.'
In certain long-distance communications services, the Commission now
favors competition among the common carriers.8 4 The entry of a small,
specialized carrier into the market previously allocated to a single car-
rier, American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T) was
heralded as a major substantive policy changei in the late 1960s.1
AT&T, however, immediately undertook the development of new tech-
nology that would enable it to provide the same low use, low cost ser-
vice offered by the challenger. Such behavior illustrates the economic
and political power of the vested interest clientele vis-a-vis the new en-
trant and the agency; their superior technological resources often
enable them to offset or diminish the effects of even major agency
policy changes.16
The Commission's second major responsibility is to regulate private
and commercial domestic broadcasting. Because the radio spectrum
is a limited, exhaustible public resource, 88 the Commission authorizes
the construction of broadcasting facilities, 9 licenses the actual broadcast
user, and allocates specific portions of the electromagnetic spectrum to
these users.40  The Commission regulates the frequency,41 power,42
and kinds of transmissions such broadcasters may engage in.48
Although the FCC is most visibly concerned with mass media broad-
casting, there are many other broadcast users who depend on license
33. Cox, The Federal Communications Commission, 11 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L.
REv. 595 (1970).
34. See Microwave Communications, Inc., 18 F.C.C.2d 953 (1969). The Commis-
sion authorized the construction of a second microwave system between St. Louis and
Chicago to compete with the AT&T long-line system already in operation. The com-
peting service would be used primarily by small computer users, who could not afford
a complete AT&T leased line because of the low volume of transmissions and the high
cost of the leased line.
35. Cox, supra note 33.
36. See PROMOTING COMPbrrnoON IN REGULATED MARKETS, supra note 3; Shepherd,
The Competitive Margin in Communications in TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN REGULATED
INDuSTRIES (W. Capron ed. 1971).
37. 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-330 (1971).
38. H. LEvwN, supra note 4, presents a well developed outline of this resource scar-
city and suggests proposals for allocation.
39. 47 U.S.C. § 319 (1970).
40. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1970).
41. 47 U.S.C. § 303(c) (1970).
42. 47 U.S.C. § 303(f) (1970).
43. E.g., 47 U.S.O. §§ 303(b), 325 (1970).
[Vol.' 1977:257
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allocation from the Commission for the continued success of their busi-
nesses.'44  For example, taxi companies and other land-mobile opera-
tors rely heavily on radio communications to operate their businesses.
Many services, both emergency (ambulance and law enforcement) and
commercial (delivery and transportation), would be unable to perform
effectively without such communications. These hundreds of thou-
sands of commercial users compete for limited spectrum space and
create a variety of allocation and clientele problems for the Commission.
These users cannot operate without licensure by the FCC, yet the
Commission must weigh their demands against those of other important
users.45
Given the technological limitations of the spectrum and its usage, the
Commission has devoted most of its effort to making a few major allo-
cation decisions. These include bandwidths for television 46 and AM
and FM radio channels as well as frequency allocation tables.
These tables specify the broadcasting channels available to a particu-
lar applicant in a specific geographic region of the country.47 Having
made these fundamental decisions, the agency concerns itself with the
license applications of individuals who seek to operate within the
guidelines established by the agency, or who desire a waiver of an
established rule. These basic allocation decisions may have profound
effects on the development of an industry. For example, the FCC
reallocated the FM broadcasting frequencies in 1945 and permitted
the then experimental VHF television allocations to become per-
manent assignments. Some observers feel this early allocation retarded
FM broadcasting at such a critical juncture in its development that the
industry will never fully recover.4"
Often the decision on a particular license application has far reaching
ramifications. Thus, the denial of a license renewal application for
WHDH in Boston in the late 1960s49 resulted in a major legislative
44. For an example of the Commission's regulations relating to some of these spe-
cial users, see 47 C.F.R. Parts 89 and 93 (1976).
45. See H. LEviN, supra note 4, at 129-37, 205-15.
46. 47 C.F.R. §§ 2.106, 2.202 (1976).
47. 47 C.F.R. Part 73, subparts A and B (1976).
48. E. KRASNOW & L. LONGLEY, THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION ch. 5
(1973).
49. 16 F.C.C.2d 1 (1969). One example of this is the area of broadcast license
renewals where the FCC has substantially altered the position of the incumbent in ob-
taining a renewal. This has not always been successful, as the Congress can and does
265Number 2]
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effort by the established broadcasters. Although these efforts to re-
store the licensing procedure that favored the renewal applicant 0
failed, the FCC was forced into a defensive position and eventually
retreated from its WHDH decision.51  It now appears that an estab-
lished broadcaster can expect favorable consideration of his renewal ap-
plication unless some major failing is brought to the attention of the
agency. 52
Occasionally the fundamental allocations established by the Commis-
sion have been challenged. Land-mobile radio users, for example,
have recently sought to obtain larger spectrum ranges for their uses.
The problem these interests face, however, is that, although not cur-
rently in use, much of the spectrum sought has been allocated and
reserved for particular clients. Thus, a major portion of the UHF
spectrum is reserved for television broadcasters even though few of the
license allocations have been taken because of economic and technical
constraints. As a result, some potential users will iot be licensed be-
cause their use does not conform to the agency's primary determination
regarding that portion of the spectrum. Although commercial and
emergency land-mobile users have made small gains in the vast areas
of the UHF spectrum,"' clientele broadcasting interests have opposed
these changes and the agency has been unwilling to permit wholesale
encroachment by others into its general plan for spectrum usage.
The Commission has also come under substantial pressure from cer-
tain broadcast interests to regulate cable television systems. 4 The
Commission initially held that CATV was not a common carrier and
get involved. Nevertheless, the WHDH case in Boston was a major adjustment of the
status quo through a renewal adjudication.
50. See Everett, FCC License Renewal Policy: The Broadcasting Lobby Versus the
Public Interest, 27 Sw. L.J 325 (1973);-Goldin, "Spare the Golden Goose"-The After-
math of WHDH in FCC License Renewal Policy, 83 HARV. L. Rnv. 1014 (1970); Jaffe,
WHDH: The FCC and Broadcasting License Renewals, 82 HAV. L. REV. 1693 (1969);
Comment, The FCC and Broadcasting License Renewals: Perspectives on WHDH, 36
U. CHr. L. REv. 854 (1969); Comment, Public Participation in License Renewals and
the Public Interest Standard of the FCC, 1970 UTAH L. REv. 461.
51. See Everett, supra note 50; Goldin, supra note 50.
52. See Everett, supra note 50; Goldin, supra note 50.
53. E.g., Channel 1 of the VHF television broadcast spectrum is completely occu-
pied by mobile users-there are no Channel 1 TV broadcast stations in this country.
Also, some small segments of the UHF spectrum have been given to these mobile users.
54. There are various treatments of CATV or Cable Television, and its regulation.
One of the more comprehensive is REPORT OF THE SLOAN COMIMSSION ON CABLE COM-
MUNICATIONS, ON TIM CABLE: THE TELEVISION OF ABUNDANCE (1971).
[Vol. 1977:257
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therefore the FCC did not have jurisdiction over it.5 Furthermore,
it doubted whether it had jurisdiction to regulate cable under the
"broadcast" provisions of the Communications Act of 1934 because
CATV systems did not use the airwaves to broadcast, and did not have
to seek licenses for broadcasting.56 The Commission petitioned Con-
gress for authority to regulate cable, but was denied this power. As
a result of mounting clientele pressure, however, the FCC gradually
began to regulate cable television systems in the early 1960s2 7 The
Supreme Court ultimately approved the FCC's action on the basis of
the Commission's "ancillary jurisdiction";58 control of cable television,
the Court reasoned, was necessary to achieve the Commission's general
policy objectives.59 In view of the Court's endorsement, the Commis-
sion entered the regulation of CATV systems energetically in the late
1960s and issued its first comprehensive set of regulations in 1972.10
B. FCC Clientele and Sovereigns
Although a substantial amount of literature exists which discusses the
relationship between an administrative agency and the business inter-
ests it regulates, 61 the generalizations do not necessarily describe the
actual dynamics within a specific agency.62 For example, the FCC is
55. Frontier Broadcasting Co., 24 F.C.C. 251 (1958).
56. D. LEDuc, CABLE TELEVISION AND THE FCC: A CIusIs IN MEDIA CONTROL
ch. 5 (1973).
57. Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459 (1962), affd, 321 F.2d
359 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963).
58. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968).
59. The Supreme Court cited and quoted 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1970):
For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communica-
tion by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as possible, to all the
people of the United States a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and worldwide
wire and radio communication service .... (emphasis added).
60. For the current CATV regulations under which the FCC deals with CATV,
see 47 C.F.R. Part 76 (1976).
See Cohen, Regulatory Report/Broadcast, Cable Industries Face Off on Cable Reform
Plan, 1976 NAT'L J. 159; Suncomm. ON COMMUNICATION OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., 2D Sass., CABLE TELEVISION:
PROMISE VERSUS REGULATORY PERFORMANCE (Subcomm. Print 1976).
61. See notes 7-10 supra and accompanying text.
62. See Wilson, supra note 10, for an enlightened discussion to the effect that the
particular agency, clientele, and statute may be structured to benefit the clientele, but
not because of any conspiracy. Rather, the agency may be created at the behest of
the industry to rationalize or systemize an otherwise chaotic allocation process. Wilson
suggests, with good historical support, that this is a basic element in the creation and
operation of the FCC.
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charged with regulating a clientele that includes large communications
carriers, small broadcasters, trade associations, and specialized groups
of users. These actors present the agency with a diverse range of con-
troversies; they also provide it with various kinds of technical and politi-
cal support.
1. Clientele
There are two major categories of FCC clientele: the communica-
tions services, both common carriers and broadcasters, and the organ-
izations that represent their respective interests. The common carrier
clientele includes the powerful industry giants such as AT&T, Western
Union, ITT, and COMSAT, as well as the weaker, but often judicially
protected, challengers such as Microwave Communications, Inc.08 The
broadcasters consist largely of small, individual or chain operations which
seek to protect their own licenses, as well as the general interests of
AM and FM radio, and VHF and UHF television. These groups are
also represented by general broadcast organizations such as the
National Association of Broadcasters, and specialized broadcast groups
such as the National Association of Business and Education Radio.
In addition to these regular clients, other groups occasionally appear
before the agency to protect their interests. Equipment manufac-
turers, for example, have an obvious interest in advocating policies
that expand the markets of their own clients. Thus, mobile radio
equipment manufacturers have actively sought greater spectrum alloca-
tions for land-mobile communications, and electronics and communi-
cations companies have benefited greatly from participating in the
Commission's allocation decisions.
The interest of the general public has recently achieved greater
access to agency proceedings through representation by various citizen
groups. Although the agency itself is charged with protecting the pub-
lic interest, 4 courts have facilitated participation by an increasing range
of public interest groups because of dissatisfaction with agency perform-
ance.65 In Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v.
63. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
64. 47 U.S.C. §§ 205(a), 302(a) (1970).
65. See note 14 supra and accompanying text. See generally D. GUIMARY, CrnI-
zENs' GROUPS AND BROADCASTING (1975); Botein, Citizen Participation in the Regulation
of Cable Television, 24 CATH. U.L. Rv. 777 (1975).
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FCC," the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia clearly ex-
pressed its concern that the FCC was only capable of representing the
interests of those whom it regulated. In United Church two citizen
groups, a local church and a national church organization, petitioned
to intervene in a television license renewal hearing. Both groups alleged
racial and religious discrimination, excessive commercialization, and
violation of the Fairness Doctrine. 7 The FCC denied the petition and
granted a provisional, one-year renewal.
In reversing the Commission's decision, the court of appeals held that
,'responsible" representatives of television viewers were entitled to par-
ticipate in agency proceedings."8 The court reasoned that although the
FCC was given the statutory duty to decide issues in the "public con-
venience, interest, or necessity," 61 it was impossible for the agency to
perform that function entirely by itself. Therefore, the court concluded
that the agency would benefit from participation by responsible groups
representing public interests. 0
2. Sovereigns
"Sovereigns" refers to those institutions that exert political, legisla-
tive, or judicial control over administrative agencies. 71 Each of the
three branches of government has authority over the FCC. The pre-
cise nature of that authority, however, varies considerably with the
institution.
Congress exerts the most extensive control over the FCC. It created
the agency, provided it with its original jurisdiction, 2 and has subse-
66. 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
67. The "Fairness Doctrine" imposes affirmative responsibilities on the broadcaster
to provide coverage of issues of public importance that adequately and fully reflect dif-
fering viewpoints. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm.,
412 U.S. 94 (1973).
68. 359 F.2d at 1003.
69. See note 64 supra.
70. 359 F.2d at 1005. Such consumers "are likely to be the only ones 'having
a sufficient interest' to challenge a renewal application."
71. For a discussion of agency "sovereigns" such as the executive branch, or con-
gressional committees or subcommittees which have some political or statutory control
over agency operations, see A. DOWNS, INSIDE BuRaAucn cy (1967).
72. In the case of the FCC this is the Communications Act of 1934, as amended,
47 U.S.C. § 301(f) (1970).
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quently passed various amendments altering the agency's power.73 In
addition, Congress exercises a variety of influential oversight func-
tions. 74 Congressional committees and subcommittees7" annually re-
view and approve the agency's budget, and investigate specific issues
or policies. These oversight powers are effective tools for influencing
agency operations and decisions.76
In contrast, the executive branch exerts influence over general policy
matters. The most obvious example of this is the presidential appoint-
ment of FCC members.77 The agency is comprised of seven commis-
sioners-including a chairman designated by the President-each serv-
ing a seven-year term. 78 A comparison of the laissez-faire approach
of the Eisenhower appointees with the aggressive regulatory policies of
the Kennedy Commissioners demonstrates the tremendous influence of
the Commissioners' regulatory philosophies on substantive agency
policy.79 Furthermore, executive agencies and task forces often formu-
late substantive policy positions which the President recommends for
agency action.80 Such recommendations have varied historically from
policy suggestions to presidential directives."a
73. See, e.g., Communications Satellite Act of 1962, 47 U.S.C. §§ 701-744 (1970);
All-Channels Receiver Act, 47 U.S.C. § 303(s) (1970).
'74. See Krasnow & Shooshan, supra note 11.
75. In particular, these are: the Senate Communications Subcommittee of the Com-
merce Committee, formerly chaired by John Pastore (D.R.I.) and the Communications
Subcommittee of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee formerly
chaired by the late Tobert MacDonald (D. Mass.).
76. E.g., the deintermixture controversy of the late 1950s and early 1960s shows
this direct constituent influence on specific legislators. R. BERNER, CONSTRAINTS ON
THE REGULATORY PROCESS: A CASE STUDY OF REGULATION OF CABLE TELEVISION
(1975); E. KRASNOW & L. LONGLEY, supra note 48. The current debate over the dereg-
ulation of CATV systems, supra note 60, illustrates the influence of the Subcommittee
in issuing critical reports on agency policy.
77. 47 U.S.C. § 154(a) (1970); SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., 2D
SESS., APPOINTMENTS TO THE REGULATORY AGENCIES: THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION AND THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 1949-1974 (Comm. Print 1976)
[hereinafter cited as APPOINTMENTS].
78. 47 U.S.C. § 154(a) (1970).
79. APPOINTMENTS, supra note 77, at 380.
80. Note 60 supra. Prior to the Nixon Administration, President Johnson used
the task force approach to explore problems in Communications. See FINAL REPORT
ON THE PRESIDENT'S TASK ON COMMUNICATIONS POLICY (1968).
81. R. BERNER, supra note 76, ch. III; Besen, The Economics of the Cable Televi-
sion 'Consensus', 17 J.L. & ECON. 39 (1974); See 47 C.F.R. Part 76 (1976); Appendix
C of Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 260 (1972). See also Ap-
pendix D, 36 F.C.C.2d at 284.
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In the past decade the judiciary has played an increasing role in shap-
ing the contours of FCC policy and procedure. By extending standing
to public interest groups, courts have attempted to ensure broader par-
ticipation in agency proceedings. Likewise, by affording members of
the general public judicial review of agency action, interests formerly
unrepresented are now judicially protected.
Appellate courts have also rendered decisions affecting the agency's
substantive policies. In a series of decisions, the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia 2 has required that anti-smoking messages by
the American Cancer Society be allowed free air time,83 and that broad-
casters provide pro-environmental statements to balance the advertise-
ments of automobile manufacturers and retail gasoline distributors.8 4
In addition, the courts have been instrumental in defining the statutory
limits of the Commission's jurisdiction."s Decisions upholding the
agency's power to regulate CATV systems 6 and to regulate and
promulgate rules with respect to the entrance of communications com-
mon carriers into the nonregulated field of data processing87 illustrate
the judiciary's willingness to expand FCC jurisdictional authority even
in the absence of explicit statutory provisions.
C. FCC Institutions and Processes
The structure of the agency itself influences its decisional processes.
The FCC has developed a series of steps for deciding cases depending
on several factors. Thus, as a case raises more fundamental questions
or becomes more controversial and the numbers and kinds of parties
increase, agency procedures become more elaborate.
1. Agency Organization. As Figure I illustrates, the Commission
is currently composed of four subject matter bureaus, outlining the major
areas of agency business, and one enforcement bureau."8 The Safety
82. 47 U.S.C. § 154(e) (1970) provides that the Commission's principal office shall
be located in Washington, D.C.
83. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
84. Friends of the Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
85. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968); see text accom-
panying note 58 supra.
86. Id.
87. GTE Service Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1973).
88. For a discussion of the current organization of the FCC, see W. EMERY, BROAD-
CASTING AND GOVERNMENT: REsPONsIBILITIES AND REGULATIONS ch. 4 (1971). A list
of those occupying the bureaucratic leadership positions can be obtained by consulting
the current FCC Annual Report.
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and Special Radio Services Bureau, which considers the license appli-
cations of amateur radio operators and the many individual spectrum
users who require radio communications for their businesses, processes
the largest volume of FCC work. 9 The Broadcast Bureau, the most
specialized division within the agency, grants licenses and approves
construction permits for domestic commercial broadcasting systems.
The Common Carrier Bureau, assigned to regulate interstate common
carriers, establishes telephone tariffs and authorizes the construction of
long-distance communications." Finally, the Cable Bureau, the newest
agency organization, regulates CATV system development.9
2. Decisional Parameters. The FCC has developed a series of pro-
cedures designed to streamline the decision-making process by allowing
most applications to be routinely processed or summarily decided.9 -
When application is made to the agency, the appropriate bureau ini-
tially determines whether the case is routine or requires specific consid-
eration by the Commission. Routine matters are disposed of by the
bureau's staff in a manner consistent with established policies and deci-
sions,"" while cases presenting important issues are considered by the
Commission. 4 The staff may either present the specific case to the
Commission at its weekly meeting for discussion and approval of recom-
mended action, or propose that the agency establish a general policy
for deciding similar cases in the future. When a particular case is
designated for a Commission hearing, the Office of Opinion and
Review gains administrative authority over the case, and the Commis-
89. Johnson & Dystel, A Day in the Life: The Federal Communications Commis-
sion, 82 YALE L.J. 1575, 1589 (1973).
90. For a description of a major undertaking by the Common Carrier Bureau in
the mid-1960s, see Cox, supra note 33, at 673-74. See also M. IRWIN, THE TELECOM-
MUNICATIONS INDUSTRY: INTEGRATION VS. CoMPErmON ch. 5 (1971).
91. For a discussion of the emergence of the Cable Bureau, after having been an
agency task force for some time, see R. BERNER, supra note 76, ch. IV. Berner also
discusses the substantial influence which the Cable Task Force and Bureau had on the
development of FCC policy toward CATV in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
92. E.g., Summary Decision Procedures, 34 F.C.C.2d 485 (1972); 47 C.F.R. § 1.251
(1976).
93. For a description of institutional decisions and the legal questions relating to
them, see K. DA vIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE ch. 11 (1958).
94. Johnson & Dystel, supra note 89, provides a comprehensive, if critical, view
of the agenda process by which items surface for Commission consideration.
R. BE NER, supra note 76, ch. IV, outlines the manner in which the staff can manipulate
the agenda to achieve its own, rather than the Commission's, policy objectives.
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sion policy controls. The relevant bureau becomes a party in the hear-
ing, and presents evidence supporting its own policy position.
The Commision has also created a Review Board composed of agency
staff members which has substantial power to consider interlocutory deci-
sions made by Administrative Law Judges and to deal with other
routine questions. 95 Although analysis of the Review Board's work is
sketchy, it appears that the Board is able to serve the Commission ade-
quately on several matters that would otherwise require Commission
consideration."
3. Decisional Processes. The decision-making process used in a
particular case will depend on the uniqueness of the question pre-
sented; whether the staff has been given policy guidelines or believes
that it can make the decision;9" whether there are intervenors or other
challengers; whether a waiver of agency rules is requested; and
whether the Commission wants to consider the particular case on its
merits, or as part of a larger policy question. For example, almost all
requests for amateur radio operator's ("ham") licenses and Citizen
Band applications are handled routinely by the agency staff according
to the general policy outlines established by the Commission. These
policies, regarding the electromagnetic spectrum allocations for such
operations, are published in the Federal Register and are available to
the public.
The licensing of commercial broadcast stations is also usually
handled routinely by the agency staff. Because the Commission has
established criteria for both the initial issuance and renewal of licenses,98
the staff can easily apply the criteria to the particular applicant and
reach a decision. The Commission is required to make a decision only
when the applicant does not meet all the criteria and seeks a waiver,
or when important general policy questions arise.90
95. 47 C.F.R. § 0.161 (1975). For a discussion of the operation of the Review
Board, its purposes, and its early accomplishments, see Freedman, Review Boards in
the Administrative Process, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 546 (1969). See also Note, Intermedi-
ate Appellate Review Boards for Administrative Agencies, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1325
(1968).
96. Freedman, supra note 95.
97. See Johnson & 'Dystel, supra note 89.
98. 47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1970). For a description of these criteria, see W. EMERY,
supra note 88, ch. 13.
99. A license renewal may be treated by the Commission itself if there is a chal-
lenge to the renewal, or if the application has any other unique characteristic. The
[Vol. 1977:257
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Although most cases are resolved through the informal processes
described above, some requests require formal agency consideration.
There are two kinds of formal Commission action. An individual hear-
ing may be provided in cases involving unique problems, such as a chal-
lenge to a license renewal or a request for a waiver of a Commission
rule. Alternatively, a formal agency rulemaking proceeding will be
held where several cases pose similar problems. Figure II illustrates
the decisional spectrum on which a particular case or a general policy
issue might be placed during FCC consideration. At the left end of
the spectrum, an individual application is routinely processed by the
agency staff. The majority of agency business falls within this portion
of the spectrum. The right end of the continuum contains cases that
can be considered either in an individual hearing or agency rulemaking
proceeding. Few cases actually reach the formal consideration stage.
The middle region of the spectrum involves cases brought to the Com-
mission's attention by the staff because either a unique question is
raised, or there exists no clear policy directive from the Commission.
The staff usually recommends a preferred disposition, which the Com-
mission generally approves. 0 " Thus, even in cases raising special
problems, the staff exerts a substantial influence on the Commission's
final resolution of the case. The majority of business before the FCC,
therefore, is controlled by the agency staff either acting upon Commis-
sion guidelines or its own expertise.' 10
challenge may come from two distinct sources. First, a competitor may seek to have
the license granted to him, and denied to the incumbent. This may result in a complex
comparative hearing. See Comment, Comparing the Incomparable: Towards a Struc-
tural Model for FCC Comparative Broadcast License Renewal Hearings, 43 U. CHI.
L. REv. 573 (1976).
The competitive hearing process has been criticized recently because the criteria the
Commission uses may not be very coherent or rational, and because the incumbent
broadcasters and their interest groups have sought economic and license protection from
the agency, the courts, and the Congress. For a good, current analysis of these efforts,
see Id.
The second source of a challenge to renewal is the presence of a citizen's group
intervenor from the broadcast area. Such an effort does not result in a competing
application for the license or the comparative hearing. Nevertheless, it does require
individual Commission attention as a result of the decision in Office of Communication
of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1005 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
100. For a good description of the weekly agenda and meeting which is the process
involved in the middle region of Figure II, see R. BERNER, supra note 76; Comment,
supra note 99.
101. See Johnson & Dystel, supra note 89.
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III. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION BUSINESS
This section of the study focuses on an empirical examination of the
business with which the FCC deals. Although debate about the agency
and its clientele demonstrates the need for such an undertaking, few
discussions present such an analysis. Yet without empirical data, state-
ments regarding the impact of intervenors on agency decisions or the
truth of the clientele-capture theory °2 can only be evaluated on an im-
pressionistic level.
The study examines the purposes and degree of success of the
parties who use the agency. It also explores the outcome of particular
requests presented to the Commission in order to examine the
clientele-capture thesis. A final series of questions concerns the
reasons for the kinds of cases, parties, and outcomes documented.
A. The Data
The data base of this study is composed of those cases decided by
the Commission or its Review Board and published in the official Fed-
eral Communication Reports for Fiscal Year 1972 (585 cases). 103 A
random sample (85 cases) of those cases reported for Fiscal Year 1974
was also taken as a means of exploring possible changes in agency op-
eration during the early 1970s. The 585 reported cases represent over
fifty-seven percent of all cases decided in 1972. The remaining cases
are only noted generally in the Reports and data from them could not
be collected. The study also does not include those unreported cases
informally resolved by the staff.
The cases analyzed below represent questions that the staff could
not routinely decide and thus fall in the middle or on the fight-hand
side of the spectrum presented in Figure II. Although they represent
only a small proportion of the total FCC business, they clearly are the
issues and cases that presented important policy questions which the
Commission or Review Board was required to decide.
102. See notes 7-10 supra and accompanying text.
103. In the subsequent discussion, Fiscal Year 1972 will be referred to as 1971/72,
and Fiscal Year 1974 will be 1973/74.
104. The Review Board decided 405 and 423 interlocutory appeals for 1971/72 and
1973/74 respectively. Personal correspondence from Aston R. Hardy, FCC General
Counsel, December 2, 1975.
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B. Cases and Parties
In describing the general features of the Commission's work for the
two years here studied, several characteristics should be noted. First,
the Commission, rather than its Review Board, decided approximately
seventy-five percent of the reported cases. This is largely because
much of the Review Board's work involves consideration of routine in-
terlocutory matters1 4 which are not reported. 05  Secondly, although
the Review Board disposes of most interlocutory matters that arise dur-
ing hearings before administrative law judges, the data suggest that
about eight to ten percent of the Commission's cases concern interlocu-
tory decisions. Nevertheless, the fact that the Commission reversed
very few of the Review Board's decisions on interloctuory matters dur-
ing the two years under study (two of 405 and one of 423 respec-
tively) 108 illustrates the Commission's reliance on the work of its
Review Board.
The kinds of cases treated by the FCC for the period studied are
outlined in Table 1. The most important figures relate to the percent-
ages in each category, for each year, and the relative percentage
changes between the two years under examination.
Table 1 Categorization of FCC Business by Type of Case and Year*
Year Total
Type of Case 71/72 73/74
(N) % (N) % (N) %
Construction Permit (52) 8.9 (9) 10.6 (61) 9.1
Petition (379) 64.8 (48) 56.5 (427) 63.7
Licenses (50) 8.5 (5) 5.9 (55) 8.2
Liability (38) 6.5 (8) 9.4 (46) 6.9
Complaint (18) 3.1 (0) - (18) 2.7
Rate Revision (11) 1.9 (1) 1.1 (12) 1.8
Cease & Desist (7) 1.2 (5) 5.9 (12) 1.8
Distant Signal (24) 4.1 (9) 10.6 (33) 4.9
Interim Authorization (6) 1.0 (0) - (6) .9
Total (585) 100.0 (85) 100.0 (670) 100.0
*Source: Appropriate volumes of FCC Reports.
105. The number of Review Board cases reported in 1973/74 is not useable here
because there is no way of determining, from the sample, the total number of cases.
106. See note 105 supra.
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Construction Permits involve the Commission's initial permission
for a broadcaster to begin construction of a broadcast facility, or alter
existing operating facilities.0 7 A Petition seeks a particular, unique
disposition of the case from the Commission, and often includes such
things as waivers of the Commission's rules, interlocutory matters dur-
ing the course of the trial, or petitions to deny a license renewal applica-
tion. The majority of cases before the Commission and the Board during
the two years involved such petitions. A License Request occurs after a
broadcast facility has been constructed and broadcasting is ready to be-
gin. This category includes requests for license transfers to new
owners of broadcast stations as well as license renewals. License per-
mits also must be obtained by non-broadcast services such as land-
mobile and emergency vehicle operations. Because not all stations that
receive construction permits enter into operation, there is some dis-
crepancy between the number of requests for construction and license
permits.
The remaining categories in Table 1 account for a relatively small
proportion of the Commission's work. Liability involves the Com-
mission's assessment of fine and forfeiture provisions for violations of
the Commission's rules and regulations. 08 The increase in the number
of cases in 1973/74 may indicate that the Commission is now devoting
more time to policing and sanctioning broadcasting violations. Com-
plaints involve the raising, by a listener, competitor, or alternative user,
of some question about the behavior of a licensee. The small number
of these cases in 1971/72 and their disappearance in 1973/74 is not
significant 0 9 because most complaints are treated informally and are
settled through an understanding or agreement. Thus, they rarely
reach the Commission's hearing stages. Rate Revisions involve com-
mon carrier requests for changes in their interstate tariffs, and as
indicated in Table 1, constitute a relatively small portion of the Com-
mission's business.110 Cease and Desist Orders are another en-
forcement element of the Commission's authority."' Again, the in-
creased proportion of these cases in 1973/74 may indicate that the
107. W. EME.RY, supra note 88, ch. 15.
108. 47 U.S.C. §§ 502, 510 (1970).
109. For treatment of the agency's handling of informal complaints, see Canon, The
FCC's Disposition of 'Fairness Doctrine' Complaints, 13 J. BROADCASTiNG 315 (1969).
110. Johnson & Dystel, supra note 89.
111. Id.
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Commission is more willing to exercise its formal, enforcement powers
over broadcast violations. The Distant Signal category relates to
CATV systems and permission to import distant signals. During
1971/72, CATV operators were required to get authorization from the
Commission before importing distant signals. In 1973/74 the CATV
operator had to obtain a Certificate of Compliance before commenc-
ing operation. The increase in these cases during this latter period
reflects the Commission's 1972 rules regarding CATV operation, and
the increased effort by CATV to expand into new markets by obtain-
ing such Certificates. As the data suggest, CATV cases constituted
an increasing portion of Commission business during 1973/74, and are
expected to become more prominent.
Table 2 FCC Petition Cases Categorized by Type of Petition*
Year
71/72 73/74
Type of Petition (N) % of total (N) % of total
cases cases
Petition relating
to rules (93) 15.9 (15) 17.7
Previous Orders (140) 23.9 (18) 21.2
Issues in Case (74) 12.6 (12) 14.2
Time Extension (16) 2.7 (3) 3.6
Total (323) 55.1 (48) 56.7
*Source: Appropriate FCC Reports.
The largest category of Commission business according to Table 1
is the Petition seeking particular Commission treatment of a case.
Table 2 presents a breakdown of Petition cases. The data indicate
that most petitions relate to orders previously issued by the Commis-
sion or the Review Board in the same case. Thus, these petitions are
generally interlocutory orders. Petitions regarding Commission rules
focus largely on waiver of the rules, and these cases comprise at least
fifteen percent of the Commission's formal business. This suggests
that the Commission devotes considerable time to considering the
granting of waivers of established rules. Issues-in-the-Case also re-
lates to interlocutory matters, and includes petitions to deny as well as
petitions either to include or exclude certain parties or issues from the
case.
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Table 3 FCC Cases Categorized by Type of Party and Year*
Year
Type of Party 71/72 73/74 Total
(N) % (N) % (N) %
Common Carrier (65) 11.1 (9) 10.6 (74) 11.0
TV Broadcaster (156) 26.7 (13) 15.3 (169) 25.2
Radio Broadcaster (216) 36.9 (36) 42.4 (252) 37.6
CATV (56) 9.6 (14) 16.5 (70) 10.5
Radio/Microwave
Service (13) 2.2 (4) 4.7 (17) 2.5
Outsider (56) 9.6 (5) 5.9 (61) 9.1
FCC Bureau (21) 3.6 (2) 2.3 (23) 3.4
Other (govt.
agency) (2) 0.3 (2) 2.3 (4) 0.6
Total (595) 100.0 (85) 100.0 (670) 99.9
*Source: Appropriate FCC Reports.
Table 3 presents the proportions and types of parties that have
appeared before the Commission in these cases.112 The percentages
in each category for each year loosely correlate with the kinds of
cases presented before the Commission. (Table 1) Cases involving
Common Carriers, however, include both rate revisions and licensing
proceedings. The closest correspondence between parties and cases
involves CATV applicants and the Distant Signal category of cases.
The proportion of CATV applicants increased nearly seven percent be-
tween 1971/72 and 1973/74, and the proportion of Certificate of
Compliance cases increased over six percent during the same period.
TV and Radio Broadcasters have traditionally been major agency
clients. It is interesting, however, to note the relative proportion of
business brought to the FCC by these industries (63.7% in 1971/72
and 57.8% in 1973/74). Thus over half the Commission's business
involves a commercial broadcaster as applicant. Common Carriers,
CATV applicants, and Outsider applicants each constitute about ten
percent of the Commission's business. The category Outsider Appli-
cants includes complaints from individual citizens, public interest
groups, and particular organizations-political parties, equipment
manufacturers, educational bodies, and local government units-re-
112. Note that throughout this analysis, the actual numbers in cells of the tables
are not as important as the percentages or proportions of cases in each cell. The pro-
portional distribution permits comparisons between 1971/72 and 1973/74, and among
categories within a year.
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questing an FCC order requiring a broadcaster to permit certain pro-
gramming, or allowing the group or individual access to commercial air
time. The percentage of this category for 1971/72 is substantially
higher than that for 1973/74. This may indicate that outsiders actually
lost access to the Commission during the latter period. It is more
likely, however, that because application can be made by any "party
in interest," the diminished proportion of outsiders applying may reflect
either a lower level of efficacy before the Commission among such
groups, or a decline in their need for formal Commission assistance.11"
During both years citizens' groups such as those present in the United
Church case 14 constituted the primary group of Outsider applicants.
The small proportion of applicants involving Radio/Microwave
Service included various mobile users. The primary participants in
this category were maritime users of radio frequencies seeking licens-
ing for special purposes. FCC Bureaus (Common Carriers, Broadcast,
and Safety and Special Radio Services) initiated a small proportion of
the cases; as noted above, 115 they appeared more frequently in Com-
mission hearings as secondary parties. In those few cases involving the
staff as an applicant, a bureau has sought to have the Commission es-
tablish a general policy that could be applied to subsequent cases. The
Other category involves applications by other governmental agencies
requesting a particular FCC allocation or permit, usually for either the
Department of Defense or the Department of State.1 "
Table 4 FCC Business Categorized by Presence
or Absence of Intervenors and by Year*
Year
71/72 73/74
Type of Intervention (N) % (N) %
No Intervenor (225) 38.5 (33) 38.9
1 Intervenor (300) 51.3 (42) 49.4
More than 1
Intervenor (60) 10.2 (10) 11.7
Total (585) 100.0 (85) 100.0
*Source Appropriate FCC Reports.
113. For empirical support for this decline, see J. GRuNDF.ESr, JR., CITIZEN PARTICI-
PATION IN BROADCAST LICENSING BEFORE nm FCC 58-60 (RAND Report, R-1896-MF,
1976).
114. 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
115. See note 90 supra and accompanying text.
116. Coase, The Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee, 5 .L & EcoN. 17
(1962).
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The data presented in Table 4 indicate the proportion of cases in
which there were one or more intervenors. For purposes of this table,
an intervenor is inclusively defined as any party in a case other than
the original applicant. On this basis, there was an intervenor who took
a position different from that of the applicant in over fifty percent of
the cases, and in another ten percent of the cases there were two or
more opponents. Thus, for both years of this study, intervenors were
present in more than sixty percent of the reported cases.
The Communications Act of 1934 specifies that "(a)ny party in in-
terest may file with the Commission a petition to deny any application
.. ,, . Thus, only a party in interest can intervene. The definition
of a party in interest, however, is not clear from the statute. Conse-
quently, the Commission can still avoid various kinds of intervention
either by refusing to designate a case for hearing, 118 or by refusing
to consider a petition to deny because it was filed by a non-party.
The Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure provide guide-
lines for intervention. 19 The procedures guarantee that a party in in-
terest may intervene by petitioning within thirty days of publication of
notice that a hearing has been scheduled. Other persons may inter-
vene by petitioning within thirty days and persuading the agency in its
discretion to permit intervention.20 Those seeking to intervene after
the thirty-day limit must satisfactorily explain their failure to file within
the allotted time period. As a matter of practice, the thirty-day limit
is rarely waived.1 2'
Tables 5a and 5b indicate several important characteristics about
intervention. Nearly all intervenors in the study were competitors-
Common Carriers, TV and Radio Broadcasters, and CATV. Al-
though the relative percentages among the competitors changed over
time, 77.6 and 80.6% of all first-party intervenors were competitors
(Table 5a). A different pattern exists for second party intervenors
(Table 5b) because the FCC staff frequently appeared as a second in-
117. 47 U.S.C. § 309(d) (1971).
118. Comment, supra note 7, at 761-65.
119. 47 C.F.R. § 1.223 (1975).
120. 47 C.F.R. § 1.223(b) (1975). Such intervention can be challenged for abuse,
but discretion is generally upheld. See WFTL Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 376 F.2d 782
(D.C. Cir, 1967); Western Conn. Broadcasting Co., 38 F.C.C.2d 977 (1973).
121. 4TC.F.R. § 1.223(d) (1975).
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Table 5a FCC Cases with Intervenors
Type of Intervenor*
(one intervenor)
Categorized by
Year
Type of First 71/72 73/74
Intervenor (N) % of 360 (N) % of 58
Common Carrier (54) 15.0 (6) 10.3
TV Broadcaster (96) 26.7 (11) 19.0
Radio Broadcaster (113) 31.4 (18) 31.0
Radio/Microwave (4) 1.1 (7) 12.1
CATV (17) 4.7 (7) 12.1
Outsider (17) 4.7 (3) 5.2
FCC Bureau (56) 15.6 (6) 10.3
Other (3) 0.8 (0)
Total (360) 100.0 (58) 100.0
*Source: Appropriate FCC Reports.
Table 5b FCC Cases with Intervenors Categorized
by Type of Second Intervenor*
Year
Type of Second 71/72 73/74
Intervenor (N) % of 60 (N) % of 10
Common Carriers (15) 25.0 (3) 30
TV Broadcasters (3) 5.0 (1) 10
Radio Broadcasters (4) 6.7 (1) 10
CATV (1) 1.7 (0)
Radio/Microwave (1) 1.7 (0)
Outsiders (4) 6.7 (0) -
FCC Bureaus (32) 53.3 (4) 40
Others (0) (1) 10
Total (60)
*Source: Appropriate FCC Reports.
100.1 (10) 100.0
tervenor. 122  In addition, most intervenors were agency clientele who
perceived a competitive threat from the application, or who sought to
replace the licensee applicant in a comparative license proceeding. This
is neither unexpected nor deleterious to the agency's functioning. The
clientele, either as applicants or as intervenors, have a substantial eco-
nomic stake in the agency's decisions, and seek to protect their positions
122. Staff intervention involves those cases in which the Commission or Board men-
tioned the staff and its position in the case. The staff was probably present in all
cases, but the figures in Tables 5a and 5b indicate cases in which the staff opposed the
position taken by the applicant
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whenever necessary by actively presenting their claims and counter-
claims.
Beyond these traditional parties who are almost always allowed to
intervene,' the issue of outsider intervention illustrates several inter-
esting developments in the agency's intervention rules since the United
Church decision. 2 ' It appears that the Department of Justice can in-
tervene in common carrier (telephone rate) cases even after the thirty-
day limit has elapsed. 12  The National Association of Broadcasters and
an independent VIF television station in New York City, (a large, non-
network user of television program transmission services of the telephone
company) have also intervened in common carrier transmission rate
proceedings.20 By contrast, the stockholders of the telephone com-
pany, and alleged users of the telephone system have not been per-
mitted to intervene in a rate case.' 27  This suggests that in cases involv-
ing common carrier petitions the clientele and other vested interest
groups may be permitted to intervene when they wish. Other out-
siders, however, must establish either that they have complied with all
Commission rules, or that they have a clear reason for seeking inter-
vention despite the rules.
In the broadcasting area, intervention has only gradually become
easier since the United Church case. Access has been denied where
123. See Florida-Georgia Television Co., 10 F.C.C.2d 722 (1967), where, because
of anti-competitive practices, the Review Board permitted a theatre operator to intervene
in a hearing involving a VHF television station construction permit. But see Middle
Georgia Broadcasting Co., 32 F.C.C.2d 974 (1972), where the Review Board denied
intervention to a competitive license applicant who sought to intervene more than three
years late, with no good cause shown for the delay. Such a delay is obviously an
extreme case.
124. 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
125. Better TV Inc., 26 F.C.C.2d 559 (1970); ABC-ITr Merger, 7 F.C.C.2d 336
(1967).
126. AT&T Co., 8 P&F RADIo REG. 2D 579 (1966); AT&T Co., P&F RADro RpO. 21)
225 (1966).
127. AT&T Co., 7 P&F RADIO REG. 2D 515 (1966). The reasoning here was that,
absent unusual circumstances, the stockholder's interest is presumed to be represented
adequately by the corporation itself. In AT&T, 5 F.C.C.2d 154 (1966), the Commis-
sion rejected intervention by alleged.small telephone, users because the petition was filed
six months late, no adequate explanation for the delay was given, and the petition did
not show how the party intervening would assist the Commission in deciding the case.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed, Telephone
Users Ass'n v. FCC, 375 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1967), although the court stated that
generally such users-the general public-would have standing to intervene in a rate
proceeding. The court felt the Commission had established reasonable rules for inter-
vention (the 30-day limit), and the delay had not been adequately explained by the
petitioner.
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groups have failed to establish a real need to intervene. In one in-
stance, the intervenor failed to demonstrate any interest in the grant
or denial of a broadcasting construction permit because it did not claim
to have members within the prospective audience and it did not suggest
any other cognizable right or injury.12 8  Two groups, the American
Board of Missions to the Jews and Beth Sar Shalom, Inc., were similarly
denied the right to intervene as parties to a license renewal proceeding.
The administrative law judge reasoned that because each group
membership was less than 10,000 out of several million in the service
area (New York City), the complaint represented their private inter-
ests rather than a public interest within the guidelines of United
Church.20 In another case a subscriber to cable television service was
denied the right to intervene because he failed to claim that he
represented a "responsible group" within the United Church prin-
ciple,1 0 and asserted no greater interest than that of any other member
of the general public. The examiner did state, however, that the in-
dividual should participate in the then-pending rule-making proceed-
ings regarding cable television.
Cases allowing outside petitioners to intervene in the broadcasting
area fall into two groups. First, the Office of Communications of the
United Church of Christ was allowed to intervene in a construction per-
mit proceeding after the thirty-day limit had expired because it demon-
strated a good cause for the delay and persuaded the judge that it could
contribute to the proceedings.'' This suggests that an intervenor can
establish a credibility or reputation with the Commission that permits
it to intervene under most circumstances. Only the Department of Jus-
tice and the Office of Communications, however, have been able to
avoid the thirty-day limitation.
In the second situation, an organization named Black Efforts for Soul
in Television (BEST) was allowed to intervene in the license renewal
application of the Alabama Educational Television Commission, even
128. In Pacifica Foundation, 28 P&F RADIo REG. 2D 972 (1973), the examiner did
give them the right, nevertheless, to participate as a non-party under 47 C.F.R. § 1.225
(1976). There was an additional error in that the petition to intervene was not filed
within the 30-day limit. See also Pacifica Foundation, 19 P&F RADio REo. 2D 631
(1970).
129. RKO General, Inc. (WOR-TV), 30 P&F RADio Rn.o. 2D 635, afl'd, RKO Gen-
eral, Inc. (WOR-TV), 48 F.C.C.2d 829 (1974).
130. Back Mountain Telecable, Inc., 8 P&F RADio Rio. 2D 955 (1966).
131. Lamar Life Broadcasting Co., 48 F.C.C.2d 807 (1974).
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though the organization had no members in Alabama.18 2 The exami-
ner reasoned that the three Alabamans who sought to intervene could
not adequately represent their claims of racial programming bias and
racially discriminatory employment practices without the assistance of
this unincorporated association. BEST was devoted to increasing the
participation of blacks and the presentation of black viewpoints on tele-
vision and radio. The organization's interests and goals were found to
be "patently . . similar to those of Alabama viewers of educational
television programs as evidenced by the present participation of three
Alabama citizens."'183  Accordingly, the examiner held that the organ-
ization, with experience and funds, could better represent the interests
of Alabama citizens than could the three citizens themselves, and
should therefore be permitted to intervene. This rationale suggests
that if the Commission believes that a claim is valid and warrants
presentation, it will permit intervention by an available organization to
represent these interests.
The following conclusion may be deduced from these examples:
the Commission will permit intervention, "all other things being equal."
The intervenor, however, must demonstrate that it is familiar with the
case, can contribute to the proceeding, will be affected by the decision,
and is "responsible" toward the conduct of a fair hearing. The Com-
mission is more likely to permit someone with a special interest such
as a competitor, a creditor, or the Department of Justice to intervene
than a party representing a "public interest' group. The Alabama case,
however, suggests the FCC will permit someone with a vague interest
to intervene if the issue raised is central or highly visible, as in the
case of racial discrimination, or if the intervenor will facilitate the ex-
pression of a legitimate interest (the viewing audience). The amorphous
interests of some groups, such as telephone users or cable subscribers,
correspond closely to those of the "consumer" and probably will be
permitted to intervene provided the representative organization appears
to be legitimate and files a petition within the allotted time.
The kinds of cases that intervenors appeared in for the two years
under study do not differ from those reported for the total population
(Table 1). Thus, the presence or absence of an intervenor does not
132. Alabama Educ. Television Comm'n, 24 P&F RADIO REG. 2D 248 (1972).
133. Id. at 252. The license renewal was eventually denied because of the claims
of these intervenors. Alabama Educ. Television Comm'n, 32 P&F RADIO REG. 2D 539
(1974).
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seem to be connected with the kind of case involved. Although there
is a relationship between certain inteyvenors (license competitors) and
certain kinds of cases (Construction Permits or Licenses), the
proportion of cases from each subject matter category that included in-
tervenors is approximately the same as those in which intervenors were
not present. This may be due to the large preporderence of competi-
tor intervenors. In fact, the presence of Outsider intervenors appears
largely in license cases, which suggests that the primary access point
for public interest intervention is in the area set out by the United
Church court in 1966-broadcast licenses and license renewals.
There appears to be little change in intervention between 1971/72
and 1973/74. The declines from 1971/72 to 1973/74 in TV Broad-
caster and Common Carrier intervenors are insignificant. The rise
of CATV intervenors probably results from the Commission's adoption
of a CATV policy after the first period studied (1971/72), and the
growth of the CATV industry by 1973/74. The decline in staff inter-
ventions may be due to budgetary and personnel constraints, or to the
Commission's failure to outline staff positions. It may also'be the result
of less energetic staff opposition to clientele applications in 1973/74.
C. Outcomes
The decisions of both the Commission and the Review Board suggest
several conclusions about the clientele-capture theory in the FCC. The
general characteristics 'of the agency's decisions during the two years
under study are presented in Table 6.114 The data are arranged so
134. The categories of outcomes used here are "granted" and "denied/partial." The
"granted" category indicates that the applicant/petitioner received what was sought. A
"denied/partial" includes those cases in which the agency denied the application of peti-
tioner, or only partially granted what was sought. These categories are combined be-
cause of the small number of partial cases, and because a partial grant indicates an
agency decision somewhat adverse to the applicant.
[Vol. 1977:257
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1977/iss2/2
Number 2]
1-.
0
oo
0Q 4
r..)
0
*2
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
D5 \0 1
00
cq N
-- 1-
cq It
o o
cf;I W; 0
co r
do
'-4-
~
0 0
z0
(5 In
0 In
~t
~ ef~
o
cz
289
Washington University Open Scholarship
290 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
the presence or absence of intervenors in the case is reflected in the
outcomes. The most striking feature of the data is the relatively high
proportion of requests granted during 1971/72 where no intervenor
was present. The presence of one or more intervenors in those cases,
on the other hand, substantially diminishes the percentage of licenses
granted. The data for 1973/74 establish a different pattern. The
percentage of requests granted in cases without intervenors is sub-
stantially lower than that for 1971/72, but is almost identical to the
1971/72 grant rate when one or more intervenors were present in the
case. This indicates either that intervenors had a much greater impact
in the 1971/72 cases than in the 1973/74 cases, or that some other
explanation exists for the relative drop in grant rates between the two
years. The suggestion that intervenors simply lost their effectiveness in
1973/74 is not persuasive. The likely impact would be the opposite:
As more public visibility is attached to public interest groups, and
as such groups become more experienced, their impact on agency
decisions should be greater.
A second explanation for the difference between the percentage of
requests granted in 1971/72 and 1973/74 is that the members of the
Commission changed between the first and second years of the study.
This is not borne out, however, by the actual personnel changes made
during that period.13,5 The more likely but more difficult explanation
to substantiate, is that as a result of public criticism, the Commission
examined the cases more closely, and granted a smaller proportion of
requests during 1973/74, with and without intervenors.
The data presented in Table 7 focus on the outcomes of cases when
categorized by the type of case involved. Certain kinds of requests ap-
pear more likely to be granted than others. During 1971/72 the cases
involving Construction Permits, Licenses, and Distant Signal Author-
izations involved relatively high proportions of grants. On the other
hand, Petitions, Liabilities, Complaints, and Rate Revisions had
lower than average percentages of grants. The high grant rates for
Construction Permits, License transactions (renewals and transfers)
135. The personnel changes during the years are as follows:
1971 1973 1974
Chairman Burch Burch Wiley
Bentley Wiley Washburn
Lee Lee Vacancy
Johnson Johnson Robinson
Lee Lee Lee
Wells Hooks Hooks
Houser Reid Reid
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and CATV Authorizations are not unexpected. Although the granting
of a construction permit may be tantamount to the granting of a broad-
cast license,18 6 there is a substantial difference between obtaining per-
mission to build a station, and constructing and operating it. The Com-
mission might assume that all construction permits will not result in op-
erating stations and therefore grant these permits more readily than it
otherwise might. License renewals and transfers, on the other hand,
have long been the subject of controversy among outside groups who
have charged the Commission with yielding to clientele pressure.18 7
The data for 1971/72 License cases confirm that the agency grants
many renewals (this category involved the highest proportion of
grants). Distant Signal Authorizations were also approved with
"rubber stamp" frequency by the Commission 3s as it sought to assist
the development of CATV systems.
The categories involving low grants suggest several patterns to FCC
decisions. The Petition category is an inclusive category that does not
lend itself to any particular explanation. Many of the petitions involved
interlocutory appeals or requests for waivers, 3 9 which the Commission
does not grant readily. The Liability cases call for the forfeiture of
money by the violator. Forfeiture is the closest thing the Commission
has to a formal sanction for violation of agency broadcast rules. Appar-
ently by the time such cases reach the Commission, a violation of the
agency's rules is clear and the Commission feels compelled to impose
liability on the violator. Thus, the Commission generally refuses to
grant the petitioner's request that liability be waived. Complaints also
involve some sanctioning activity. Although the Commission does
grant some Complaints and investigates and penalizes some broad-
casters under this category, the low grant rate illustrates the reluctance
of the Commission to impose sanctions indiscriminately, especially in
cases where the facts and violation are less clear. The grant rate in
Rate Revision cases is below the average and suggests that the Com-
mission may require justification for a revision before granting its
permission.
The pattern for Table 7 during 1973/74 is similar to that for
1971/72. The same categories of cases involve high grant rates-
136. W. EMERY, supra note 88; Johnson & Dystel, supra note 89.
137. Comment, supra note 99.
138. For an explanation of this pattern, see R. BFaNER, supra note 76.
139. See Table 2 and accompanying discussion,
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Construction Permits, Licenses, and Distant Signal Authorizations
(Certificates of Compliance). Although the Rate Revision category
had a very high grant rate, it involved only one case and should not
be emphasized. The Liability cases show an even stronger tendency
by the Commission to impose liability (100%), although no complaints
were processed in the 1973/74 sample. The other enforcement cate-
gory, Cease and Desist, remained at the average 1971/72 grant rate.
The data in Table 8 categorize outcomes by the kind of party making
the request. During 1971/72 the parties obtaining the highest rates
of grants included the FCC staff, CATV operators, and Radio/Micro-
wave Services. The staff's success is not surprising in view of the vari-
ous studies measuring their impact on the agency. 140  CATV success
relates largely to the Distant Signal category of cases, and the policy
apparently followed by the Commission and staff.14 1  The Radio/
Microwave Services rate of grants might also be connected with the
kinds of requests made by this group--for operating licenses in already-
existing frequency spaces.
The infrequent winners during this period included Outsiders seek-
ing an affirmative response to some claim. Furthermore, Radio
Broadcasters had a substantially below average rate of grants. This
might be connected with the kinds of questions they presented-Peti-
tions and Liability claims. When the broadcasters presented licens-
ing issues--transfers or renewals-they were generally treated favor-
ably (Table 7), but the other requests made by many broadcasters, es-
pecially Radio Broadcasters, tended to reduce the proportion of grants
for that category. The pattern for 1973/74 is basically the same as
for 1971/72. CATV, Radio/Microwave Services, and the FCC staff
had the highest proportion of grants; Outsiders and Radio Broad-
casters received the lowest grant rate.
The data from Tables 7 and 8 suggest several conclusions about
clientele capture in the FCC. If the normal rate of grants is taken to
be around thirty-five percent, 142 then certain kinds of clientele-Radio
Broaadcasters specifically-tend to lose. Other clientele groups, such
as Common Carriers, are at the average rate of grants. Still other
140. See R. BERNER, supra note 76; Johnson & Dystel, supra note 89, for a treat-
ment of the staff role in Commission decisions.
141. See R. BERNER, supra note 76.
142. This is approximately the proportion for all categories, although the 1971/72
grant rate of 42.7% is slightly higher.
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groups, especially CATV and Radio/Microwave Services, receive a
favorable proportion of FCC grants. This pattern reflects agency
policy features more than clientele control of the Commission's de-
cisions. Significantly, the likelihood of having a high or low grant
rate appears to be more related to the question presented than to the
party presenting it. The CATV and Radio/Microwave Services parties
presented questions that the Commission either wished to grant for
policy reasons or could easily grant because of an established policy.
On the other hand, the Outsider group consistently lost when requesting
agency action. This group includes individuals or organizations that
seek changes-sometimes dramatic changes-in agency policies. No
agency, whether "captured" or not, will easily grant requests that re-
quire sharp policy changes.
If intervenors had any impact on the outcome of the agency's deci-
sions, that impact appears only in 1971/72. This indicates that inter-
vention was not the causal factor in granting or denying the request in
most cases. The actual impact of intervenors will be explored in the
next section of this study.
D. Relationships and Impact on Outcome
The preceding tables suggest that intervenors have not had a sharp
effect on the decisional outcome of agency cases. Table 6 indicates
that although there was a relationship between the presence of inter-
venors and the proportion of cases granted or denied in 1971/72,
it is not clearly a causal one, and in 1973/74, there was no relationship
at all. Tables 5a and 5b (the kinds of intervenors) suggest that only
a small proportion of intervenors are not clientele competitors. This
data suggest that because competing applicants rather than public in-
terest groups are the major source of intervention, the agency does not
give the case or the intervening parties special treatment and thus has
no basis for denying the application. Rather, the grant and denial of
such applications may be based on factors largely unrelated to the
presence or absence of a competitor intervenor.
To analyze this proposition, Table 9 presents the data contained in
Tables 5a and 5b categorized by type of intervenor and outcome. The
table displays only the first or primary intervenors in cases with one
or more intervenors."' It appears, first, that some intervenors seem
143. There were so few cases involving second intervenors that any presentation of
these would add little to the analysis presented in the text.
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to be present in more denials than others: The FCC staff, CATV, and
Common Carrier intervenors during 1973/74 achieved a high rate of
denials (success). Secondly, when the rate of denials is compared with
the average or total rate of denial for the corresponding year, it appears
that for 1971/72 the FCC staff, TV Broadcasters, and Radio Broad-
casters were above the average. In 1973/74, Common Carriers,
CATV, Radio/Microwave Systems, and FCC staff were above aver-
age. During the first year, the two broadcaster categories were
only slightly above average, but this may suggest that the presence of
a competing intervenor was more likely to result in a denial than was
the presence of any other intervenor. The FCC staff appears to have
a substantial influence when it intervenes and opposes an application
or petition.
The most dramatic changes between the two years were the sharp
decline in the impact of TV Broadcaster intervenors and the sharp in-
crease in the impact of CATV intervenors. The latter pattern can be
explained by the Commission's increasing sensitivity to CATV policy
questions. Pressure within the CATV industry as it became more com-
petitive for profitable markets, as well as the controversial nature of
the issues presented in individual applications, raised both the likeli-
hood of competitor intervention and FCC awareness of the issues. As
the agency became sensitized to CATV issues, it probably attributed
more weight to the competitors' claims. The decline in the impact
of TV Broadcaster intervenors is not as easily explained, and may re-
flect an emerging agency insensitivity to the claims of TV competitors.
Outsiders, such as public interest representatives, had little impact
on agency decisions. They succeeded in getting only eleven percent
of their cases denied in 1971/72, and thirty-three percent in 1973/74.
The increase suggests that the Commission may have become more
amenable to the claims of these groups. That process, however, will
be quite gradual, and will depend more on the individual merits of each
intervenor's claims than on the mere presence of a public interest inter-
venor.
The data suggest the following conclusions: the established clien-
tele, broadcasters, do not seem to have great strength as intervenors,
even when their economic interests are affected by the agency's deci-
sion. The CATV interests may be on the rise, both in terms of favor-
able policy decisions by the Commission and in terms of blocking ad-
verse agency decisions by means of intervention. The Outsider inter-
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ests, the original focus of the United Church case,' 4  and the public in-
terest movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s, do not seem to
have had a major impact on the agency's decisions. Although there may
be a long term trend in the agency toward increased consideration of
the claims of such public interest groups, a larger data base is required
to substantiate this pattern.
It is possible that intervenors alter the outcome even though the peti-
tion is not completely denied. The parties may compromise and agree
to the Commission's grant of a modified petition, or the Commission
may issue a partial grant of the original petition. This suggestion is
difficult to corroborate because the published reports do not often refer
to such compromises. The Partial categories for the data, when
separated out, however (Table 6), give limited support for this view
of intervenor impact. Given that most intervenors were competitors
seeking the allocation of an exclusive resource, it appears likely that
they would join in a compromise such as a joint ownership of the license
or broadcast facilities. There is evidence in a few cases indicating that
the petitioner compromised, or attempted to satisfy the claims of the
intervenor, in order to reduce the weight of their claims.1 "4
It is possible that the intervenor had some impact on the outcome
even if no compromise were reached. A split decision by the agency
may indicate that the intervenor persuaded a minority of the Commis-
sion of the justness of its claim. To test this theory, the data in
Table 10 were collected to show the size of the vote categorized by
the presence or absence of intervenors.
It appears that the presence of intervenors actually increases the like-
lihood of obtaining a unanimous vote from the deciding body. This
suggests that intervenors are unable to create dissatisfaction within the
Commission or the Board simply by being present in the case. The
decision-making body may, in fact, solidify more when intervention has
been permitted than when there is no outsider or competitor participant
in the case.
144. 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
145. This seems to be the case in Alabama Educ. Television Comm'n, 33 F.C.C.2d
495 (1972); Alabama Educ. Television Comm'n, 24 P&F RADIo REo. 2D 248 (1972).
This apparently failed, however, as the FCC eventually denied the license renewal ap-
plication, supra note 132.
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Table 11 outlines the outcome of the cases in terms of the rationales
used by the Commission. This may provide some indication of the pat-
terns of reasoning used in the agency proceedings. The first category,
Procedural Reasons, includes a variety of justifications for particular de-
cisions. The data indicate this rationale is used primarily to deny peti-
tions. The Public Interest rationale is relied upon quite heavily for
granting a request. Given the nebulous meaning of this term, it ap-
pears that the Commission will use it whenever possible, especially
when there is no specific reason for approving the outcome. The third
rationale, that Commission Policy Dictates the outcome, involves the
routine guidelines developed for the staff and Review Board and is re-
lied upon when the Commission wishes to pursue existing precedent,
or when the Review Board wishes to follow Commission policy. The
Party Responsibility category is used almost solely in Liability cases
where the Commission insists on imposing the sanction despite the re-
quest for an exemption. The proportion of denials clearly indicates its
one-sided use. The Burden of Proof rationale is used mostly when
the petitioner failed to carry his burden or to substantiate his claims.
Denial is the likely result in such cases. The Issue-Already-Resolved
justification involves previous settlement of the particular case, by
either the parties (applicant and intervenors) or between the party and
the staff.
This analysis indicates that the Commission "hides" behind particular
rationales to reached desired outcomes. The Public Interest rationale
is clearly used when the Commission needs some reason for granting
the request. Procedural Reasons and the Burden of Proof are used
frequently to justify a denial of requests. The other categories (Com-
mission Policy and Issues-Already-Resolved) have little connection with
the outcome.
E. Subsequent Case Developments
Parties losing at the Commission level may appeal the decision in
the federal courts of appeals. 4 ' This is extremely costly for both appel-
lants and the agency, however, and the data indicate that only a small
number of appeals are taken. Twenty-two of the cases in 1971/72
(3.5%) and two of the cases in 1973/74 (2.4%) were appealed by
the losing party.
146. 47 U.S.C. § 402 (1970).
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Despite the United Church decision, 47 the courts of appeals generally
uphold an FCC decision on appeal.148  The data indicate that the
Table 12 Appellate Court Treatment
of FCC Cases by Year*
Outcome
Total Affirmed
Year(FY) (N) (N)
1973
1972
1971
1970
1969
1968
1967
1966
1965
1964
1963
1962
1961
1960
1959
1958
1957
1956
1955
1954
1953
1952
1951
1950
1949
1948
1947
(21)
(27)
(32)
(21)
(31)
(18)
(28)
(28)
(19)
(31)
(20)
(16)
(20)
(21)
(21)
(20)
(12)
(18)
(8)
(3)
(0)(1)
(6)
(6)
(9)(2)
(2)
87.5
87.1
76.2
80.8
75.6
81.8
87.5
93.3
67.9
83.8
76.9
80.0
74.1
91.3
52.5
62.5
48.0
64.3
47.1
75.0
25.0
85.7
75.0
60.0
66.7
100.0
Reversed
% (N)
(3)
(4)
(10)
(5)
(10)
(4)
(4)
(2)
(9)(6)
(6)
(4)
(7)
(2)
(19)
(12)
(13)
(10)
(9)
(1)(1)(3)
(1)
(2)
(6)
(1)
(0)
Total
Decided
%1 (N)
12.5
12.9
23.8
19.2
24.4
18.2
12.5
6.7
32.1
16.2
23.1
20.0
25.9
8.7
47.5
37.5
52.0
35.7
52.9
25.0
100.0
75.0
14.3,
25.0
40.0
33.3
(24)
(31)
(42)
(26)
(41)
(22)
(32)
(30)
(28)
(37)
(26)
(20)
(27)
(23)
(40)
(32)
(25)
(38)
(17)
(4)
(1)
(4)
(7)
(8)
(15)
(3)
(2)
Total (441) 74.9 (148) 25.1 (589)
*Source: Appropriate FCC Reports.
147. 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
148. For a general discussion of the relationship between agencies and the U.S. Su-
preme Court, see Canon & Giles, Recurring Litigants: Federal Agencies Before the
Supreme Court, 25 W. POL. Q. 183 (1972). For substantive discussions of appellate
review of FCC decisions for the years covered, see Collins, Judicial Review of FCC
Decisions: 1968-1969, 23 FED. CoM. B.J. 57 (1969); Swift, Judicial Review of FCC
Decisions. 1969-1970, 24 FED. CoM. B.J. 86 (1970); Swift, Judicial Review of FCC
Decisions: -1970-1971, 25 FED. Com. B.J. 66" (1972); Beizer & Quale, Judicial Review
of FCC Decisions: 1972, 25 E. CoM. BJ. 251 (1973).
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Commission is affirmed approximately fifty percent of the time (10 of
22 in 1971/72 and 1 of 2 in 1973/74). This pattern is strengthened
by the data contained in Table 12, which explores appellate court treat-
ment of FCC decisions made prior to 1971/72.111 One may conclude
that either the Commission makes few reversible errors or the court
simply defers to the Commission's judgment.
Although the data only illustrate the relationship between the FCC
and the courts of appeals (and does not include the Supreme Court),
the pattern of support is clear. On the average the appellate courts af-
firmed approximately three out of every four appeals. This factor,
even more than the constraints of delay and expense, may explain why
so few losing parties appeal FCC decisions. This data also refutes the
conventional wisdom that the clientele will appeal any adverse decision.
It appears that a party carefully weighs the costs and likelihood of
success before appealing agency decisions.
F. Alternative Forms of Participation
This study has focused on formal participation in agency hearings by
intervenors. This kind of participation was first extended to television
viewers in the United Church decision.150 Alternative forms of partici-
pation available to citizen groups, however, might be more efficient and
effective in terms of costs and outcomes. 1' Participation in rule-
making procedures, for example, may be less costily for outsider groups
and have a significant impact on the Commission's general policy.
Through informal negotiation with licensees, citizen groups may be able
to secure agreements with the broadcasters regarding programming, as-
certainment, hiring practices, or program production, without incurring
the expense of filing a formal petition to deny the license renewal appli-
cation. Although broadcasters have criticized such negotiations be-
cause of the potential for blackmail and bad faith threats of a petition
to deny by the outsider group, the number of such informal settlements
has increased substantially in recent years.152 The leverage provided
149. These cases involve a larger number of appeals than the empirical data for
this study probably because of carryover of pending cases from previous years. The
figures in Table 12 are only the actual reversals and affirmances during the year; they
do not reflect cases settled or withdrawn, or the backlog of cases.
150. 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
151. For a discussion of various forms of participation and their relative efficiency,
see J. GRuNDF.ST, JR., supra note 113, at 5-29, 56-71.
152. See J. GRuNDFBsr, JR., supra note 113; Kutler, Citizen Participation in Broad-
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by this threat may give the citizen group more influence in negotiations
than in the formal proceeding. In addition, the outsider group may, as
part of the settlement agreement, be reimbursed by the broadcasters
for its legal and technical expenses.'
The Commission has encouraged competing broadcast license appli-
cants to resolve their differences informally and reach an agreement
that results in a single license or renewal application. 4  The Joint
Petition for Approval of a Dropout Agreement has been widely used
by competitors and approved by the Commission. This policy should
be extended to include disagreements between broadcast license appli-
cants and outside challengers. It would save the Commission the time
and effort involved in examining the case and reduce the costs of inter-
vention for the outsiders. The FCC has only recently formulated a
policy regarding such settlements. 5 5 It accepts the outside negotiation
process in principle, and is generally amenable to such agreements when
they are presented to it for approval.' 56 The issues surrounding this
policy relate to programming control, enforcement of settlements, Com-
mission review of settlements, and reimbursement agreements. Al-
though it may be cheaper for the Commission and the outsiders to settle
informally, the settlement costs for the broadcaster are often greater
than those incurred in an unopposed license renewal application.
Nevertheless, with the rise in citizen participation, unchallenged pro-
ceedings, formerly widespread, may become infrequent, and the costs of
a negotiated settlement may now be the common and cheapest process
available to the licensee.
cast Regulation: A Study of the Local Agreement Process (Unpublished Master's The-
sis, University of Pennsylvania, 1974).
153. See Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 465 F.2d
519 (D.C. Cir. 1972); FINAL REPORT AND ORDER IN THE NONCE OF INQUIRY AND PRO-
POSED RULEMAXING IN THE MATTER OF REIMBURSEMENT FOR LEGITIMATE AND PRUDENT
EXPENSES OF A PUBLIC INTEREST GROUP FOR A CONSULTANCY TO A BROADCASTER IN
CERTAIN INSTANCES, Docket 19518, FCC 76-5 (January, 1976).
154. As an example of a Joint Petition for Approval of a Dropout Agreement, see
I. T. Parker, 9 P&F RADIO REG. 2D 1358 (1967).
155. For a description of the development of the FCC rule, see J. GRUNDFEST, JR.,
supra note 113, at 59. See also FINAL REPORT AND ORDER IN THE MATrER OF AGREE-
MENT BETWEEN BROADCAST LICENSEES AND THE PUBLIC, Docket 20495, FCC 75-1359
(December, 1975).
156. For an analysis of five cases involving settlements submitted to the Commission
for approval after its Rule on Agreements Between Broadcast Licensees and the Public,
see J. GRtNDF-sr, JRI, supra note 113, ch. V.
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Whether negotiated settlements occur between competing appli-
cants for a license (an established practice) or between the licensee
and outsiders (a recent pattern), they are now a widespread practice
in the broadcast industry and are likely to increase. Furthermore, the
data indicate that because of the expense, delay, and predictable re-
sults, formal agency regulatory decisions are declining despite the in-
creased outsider participation required by judicial decisions. Whether
these developments are advantageous to the Commission or its clientele
is an open question.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This study has focused on a variety of issues relating to clientele
treatment by the Federal Communications Commission and the emerg-
ing role of public intervenors in agency decisions. Several conclusions
may be drawn. First, the opening of FCC proceedings by court deci-
sions has not had a revolutionary effect on agency business, its process,
or its decisions. Public intervenors do not appear in many of the
agency proceedings, and their presence does not have a substantial im-
pact on the outcomes. Several factors may explain this result. Initi-
ally, potential intervenors often do not have adequate notice of the
agency proceeding. In addition, they lack the necessary organization,
expertise, and funds to intervene. Because these problems have not
been resolved by any particular agency or governmental policy, it is un-
likely that formal intervention will become widespread or successful.
Furthermore, the opening of agency proceedings to outsiders may
increase alternative means of holding broadcasters responsible to "pub-
lic" interests. The leverage that a citizen group has in threatening
intervention may induce the broadcaster to negotiate informally with
the group in order to avert opposition in a formal proceeding. Al-
though these alternative means of resolving conflicts between the public
and broadcasters may be quite effective, as yet there is no agency
supervision of informal agreements and settlements. Such supervision
may be necessary in order to guarantee public impact upon the resolu-
tion of broadcasting issues.
Finally, the amount and kind of organized opposition to FCC policies
may be increasing, even though it might not appear in formal agency
proceedings. Public opponents to the regulated clientele may be sensi-
tizing the agency to other public considerations, even though these con-
siderations may fail to reach formal agency proceedings or ultimately
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lose. Time and further study are required before definitive conclu-
sions may be reached about the forms of public opposition and their
effect on agency decisions.
The clientele-capture thesis is not strongly supported by the data
used in this analysis. The percentage of agency denials of requests is
sufficiently high (nearly 66%) to suggest that the agency denies a
large proportion of clientele requests, with or without intervention by
public opponents. Even if an adverse decision deals with an interlocu-
tory matter, rather than the final, substantive issue in a case, the data
suggest that the clientele does not always "win" before the agency.
The development of CATV during the period studied here may illus-
trate the emergence of new clientele. The agency's treatment of
CATV cases suggests that it may be quite sensitive to this portion of the
regulated industry. Whether this treatment will diminish with time is
unclear. It is possible, however, that newer portions of the industry
may be able to exert greater, and often highly successful, influence on
the agency, at least during their incipiency.
The attempts to "democratize" the FCC have not been a resounding
success. Gradual, incremental changes in the agency's procedures and
policies, however, may have occurred. As with any political institution,
the agency has been able to absorb and diminish much of the impact
of these "revolutionary changes." No agency, however, remains static,
and in its procedures and policy outcomes the FCC appears to have
accommodated, at least to some extent, this impetus for change.
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